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It has been more than thirty five years since the publication of Downs's ( 1 957)  seminal volume 
on  elec tions and spatial theory and more than for ty since B lack and Newing ( 1 95 1 )  offered their
analysis of majority rule and committees . Thus, in response to the question "What have we 
accomplished since then?" it is not unreasonable to suppose that the appropriate answer would be "a 
great  d eal ."  Unfortunately ,  reality admits of only a more ambiguous response. 
It is tru e  that developments in the spatial analysis of committees and elections has covered 
considerable ground since 1 957 .  Beginning with Davis and Hinich's ( 1 966) introduction of the 
mathematics of Euclidean preferences, Plott's ( 1 967) treatment of contract curves and symmetry, and 
Kramer's ( 1 972) adaptation of Farquharson's ( I  969) analysis of strategic voting in committees with 
spatial p references, many of Downs's and Black and Newing's ideas have been made rigorous and 
general .  The idea of spatial preferences -- of representing the set of feasible a lternative as a subset 
of an m-dimensional Euclidean space, of labeling the dimensions "issues,"  of assuming that people 
( legislators or voters) have an ideal preference on each issue, and of supposing that each person's 
preference (utility) decreases as we move away from his or her m-dimensional ideal  policy - - is now 
commonplace and broadly accepted as a legitimate basis for modeling electorates and parliaments. 
Moreover, since Weisbergh and Rusk's ( 1 970) initial application of multi-dimensional scaling, 
considerable advances have been made in developing statistical methodologies for measu ring those 
preferences within electorates (see, for example, Enelow and Hinich 1 982,  A ldrich and McKelvey 
1 977 ,  Poole and Rosenthal 1 984, Chu, Hinich and Lin 1 993)  and legislatures (Hoadley 1 98 7 ,  Poole  and 
Rosenthal 1 985  1 99 1  ) .  
At the same time, spatial analysis has moved only modestly beyond modeling the simplest 
possibilities - - two candidate plurality rule elections, exogenously imposed amendment  voting 
agendas , and the formation of majority parliamentary coalitions. Although there are any number of 
specialized models and empirical case studies,  there remains preciously little generalized theory about 
a lternative institutional structures or experience with applying elements of spatial theory to more 
complex political systems to which we can refer when contemplating the design of political 
insti tu tions for, say, newly emerging democracies .  What, for example, can we say about party- list 
proportional representation systems employing two or more multi -member districts or systems with 
multiple candidates and runoff provisions that matches the theoretical generality and simplicity of 
the Median Voter Theorem? What do we know about, say, those political systems, including our own, 
in  which policy cannot be imposed by a single victorious candidate but must instead be approved by 
multiple branches of government, each of which answers to voters under different rules? Where are 
the definitive theorems about committee processes that allow for the endogenous deter mination of 
such things as voting agendas and sub-committee j urisdictions? Indeed, do we even know whether 
such results are possible or desirable? 
A lthough the literature is beginning to address such questions, the spatial analysis of both 
committees and elections suffers from a number of deficiencies that are sufficiently serious so as to 
make it uncomfortable defending that analysis against the charge of having failed to produce the 
volume of ideas that we could reasonably anticipate in thirty or forty years (for a sense of the rate 
of progress, the reader can consult my 1 976  survey of the literature as it existed in the early 70's and
Mueller's 1 989  more general survey of Public Choice). Some of these deficiencies, especially those 
that pertain to the adequacy of a spatial representation of preferences and the limited institutional 
structures considered,  apply to research on both committees and elections. Other d eficiencies are 
unique to one area or the o ther .  On the other hand, I also want to argue that spatial analysis has 
altered fundamentally the way we think about voting, elections, and parliaments, and that both 
implicitly and explicitly it contribu tes much to those who study democratic politics. 
I. Fundamental Th eore tical Achieve ments 
SOCIAL CHOICE: It is tempting to focus on formal definitions and fundamental theorems when 
surveying a mathematically deductive field with as extensive a literature as spatial analysis (for a 
comprehensive bibliography see Coughlin 1 992).  Surprisingly, though, there are few results that 
warrant the label "fundamental." There is, of course, 
B lack's ( 1 958)  theorem about single-peakedness and the existence of a Condorcet 
winner (roughly, if voters have well-defined preferences that can be scaled a long a 
single issue dimension, then the electorate's median preference is a Condorcet winner 
-- an outcome that defeats every other one in a majority vote) .  
the Davis-Hinich-Plott-Sloss ( 1 966, 1 967 , 1 973)  generalizations to multi -dimensional 
issue spaces (roughly, a Condorcet winner exists if and only if a m ul tidimensional 
median exists, which requires a very special c lass of preference distributions; for 
subsequent refinements see Davis, De Groot and Hinich 1 972, McKelvey and 
Schofield 1 986) .  
the McKelvey ( 1 976, 1 979) and Schofield ( 1 978)  "chaos" results about intransitive 
social preferences (roughly, if there is no Condorcet winner,  then the social 
preference order under majority rule is wholly intransitive when preferences are 
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spatial - - every outcome can be reached from every other outcome by some paired 
sequence of votes over feasible outcomes). 
Caplan and Nale buff's ( 1 99 1 )  proof that something less that 2;3rds rule (64% to be
precise) can ensure a two-candidate spatial equilibrium for a broad c lass of electoral 
preference distributions (see also Greenberg 1 979 and Schofield 1 985 ,  as well as 
Enelow's d iscussion of the literature on majority cycles in this volume) .  
These theorems, though, have less to do  with modeling elections or  legislatures than with 
describing the social preference order as i t  is defined by majority rule and its variants .  A lthough the 
labels attached to things convey the impression that these results concern elections or legislatures -­
candidates choosing platforms, voters choosing between platforms, legislators voting over agendas, 
and parliamentary bodies negotiating coalitions or governments -- those results tell us more about the 
abstract properties of majority rule applied to Euclidean preferences than anything else. Converting 
these analyses into models of actual  political processes requires greater attention to institutional 
structure and to the strategic imperatives that alternative structures allow. Indeed, as McKelvey 
( 1 979 :  1 1 06) himself argues ,  "any attempt to construct positive descriptive theory of political processes 
based on majority rule . . .  must take account of particular institutional features of these systems, as 
the social ordering by itself [and by implication, the analyses that  focus exclusively on the properties 
of that ordering] does not give much theoretical leverage." 
It is at this point - - supplying ins ti tu tional detail and giving substantive meaning to an abstract 
characterizations of social preference orders -- that the analysis of elections and the analysis of 
committees diverge. Different institutional contexts present us with different restrictions on choice, 
different relationships between choice and outcomes, different strategic circumstances and 
opportunities ,  and, therefore, different analytic challenges. The more theoretical implication of 
McKelvey's argument, though, is that the spatial analysis of committees and elections is but a specific 
application of game theory - - of ideas about strategies, extensive forms, strategic forms, and 
equilibria -- where the precise form of that application is determined by the insti tution under 
investigation. Spatial analysis offers a specific characterization of the preferences of some decision 
makers (voters and committee members) and of the strategies of others (candidates) .  However, we 
can say that we possess a model of an election, a parliament, or a legislative committee only after we 
take into account those features of the situation that define the relationship between choice and 
outcomes and that structure the inter-relationships among different dec ision makers.
The l imitations of spatial analysis we describe subsequently, then, fall into two categories. First, 
there are those things that pertain to the adequacy of the spatial assumption itself - - the adequacy of 
a Euclidean conceptualization of issues and individual preferences and the extent to which relevant 
d ecision makers can be said to operate within the same spatial conceptual fram ework. Second, there 
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is the adequacy of the models we use to describe institutional structure - - the adequacy of the game­
theoretic description of the things that structure choices and dictate the correspondence between 
choices and outcomes over which spatial preferences are defined . 
COMMITTEES: The issue for committees is understanding the nature of cooperative (coalitional) 
agreements , how those agreements are sustained when they must be self-enforcing, how alternative 
procedural rules influence final outcomes , and how the messages of voters as expressed in elections 
are transformed into public policy within a legis lature or parliament. We cannot review that literature 
in detail here except to highlight a few general things. 
The usual and simplest approach to the spatial analysis of committees is to suppose that members 
of the committee are finite in number, have spatial preferences, and must choose a policy in the 
policy space using some exogenously determined rule such as unconstrained majority rule bargaining, 
a binary agenda (e.g . ,  an amendment agenda), or issue-by-issue voting. In the case of the first 
a l ternative - - if the committee is assumed to be unconstrained by any explicit procedural  rule aside 
from the provision that a majority coalition can dictate any outcome -- there is an immediate 
correspondence between that committee's structure and the usual con text of social choice theory's 
analysis of m ajority rule. The usual cooperative solution hypothesis for a simple majority rule game 
is the Core -- the set of outcomes that are undominated in a majority vote by any other. Thus, 
a lthough a Condorcet winner does not correspond identically to the Core (a Condorcet winner is the 
Core because it dominates all other alternatives whereas an element of the Core need not be a 
Condorcet winner), the correspondence is c lose enough to tell us that with spatial preferences, a non­
empty Core exists, for the most part, only if a Condorcet winner exists (for precise relationsh ips see 
Sloss 1 973 )  - - only if the distribution of ideal points within the committee satisfies some strong 
regularity conditions (Davis and Hinich 1 966, 1 967 ,  Plott 1 967 ,  Davis, DeGroot and Hinich 1 972,  
Kramer 1 97 3 ,  McKelvey and Schofield 1 986; again, see Enelow's survey in this volume). 
Prior to the focus on Euclidean preferences, judgements about the severity of the likelihood of 
a non-empty Core or a Condorcet winner -- of being able to make an unambiguous prediction about 
final outcomes -- were based on two things: (I) since the Core is empty for constant-sum cooperative 
games, an assessment of whether the committee's environment is constant sum; and (2) tabulations of 
the relative frequency of cyclic social preferences ( i .e . ,  for a committee of a given size and for a given 
number of a lternatives , what is the probability, if all preference orders are equally likely, that the 
social order is transitive?) .  Neither of these approaches, though, gave much general insight because, 
first, a non-constant sum environment is merely a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a non­
empty core, and, second, the assumption of equiprobability is merely a null-model assumption 
without an empirical referent. Bu t once McKelvey ( 1 976) addressed this problem in  a spatial context, 
we understood more fully the potential for intransitivity and empty cores. 
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The theoretical pervasiveness of social intransitivities caused considerable consternation and led 
at  least one eminent  stud ent of the field to conclude that a science of politics may be a practical 
impossibility (Riker 1 980). However, the fact that a wide class of games possessed empty cores came 
as l ittle surprise to game theorists, who were armed with a variety of hypotheses -- V-sets , bargaining 
sets, kernels , value theory, and so on -- to treat those circumstances in which every outcome can be 
dominated (defeated in a majority vote) by some other .  Unfortunately,  all such hypotheses suffer 
from two inadequacies .  
First, these ideas are based on ad hoc assumptions about bargaining and the properties of 
outcomes ,  which derives from the practical difficulties of modeling most  interesting cooperative
processes using extensive- or strategic-form representations. Although i t  is important not only to 
make predictions about coalitions and outcomes but also about how agreements are enforced, not al l  
cooperative processes can be reduced to some analytically tractable extensive- or  strategic-form game, 
which is what we require for the study of this subject (for political models that examine enforcement 
see Baron and Ferejohn 1 987 ,  McKelvey and Reisman 1 99 1 ,  Niou and Ordeshook 1 990, 1 993 ,  B ianco 
and Bates 1 990). Indeed , the study of parliamentary and legislative coali tions seems resistant to such 
models owing to the complexity of the processes within these institutions (on the other hand, see 
Baron 1 99 1  for one such extensive form model of parliamentary government formation). Thus, as 
a substitute for complexity (and , in all likelihood, as a substitute for equally ad hoc assumptions that 
would need to be imposed to form a tractable model to study enforcement) the game theorist imposes 
the ad hoc assumptions upon which cooperative coalition theory rests such as equally probable 
coalitions, and internal and external stability (for an attempt to bring some axiomatic coherence to 
this literature see Schwartz 1 990).  
The second problem with cooperative solution theory derives from the first. Because cooperative 
theory does not model the institu tional context of bargaining, we cannot j udge it in the same way we 
j udge an extensive or strategic-form model of some political- institutional s ituation -- by how wel l  
assumptions model institutional structure. Instead, aside from results about existence o r  uniqueness, 
we can only judge a particular solution hypothesis by seeing whether i ts predictions are "reasonable. "  
Unfortunat ely, the traditional framework of cooperative game theory -- games in  characteristic 
function form -- provide too abstract a basis for judging reasonableness; fortunately,  the spatial 
analysis of majority voting games gives us what we need . Not only do we learn that the Core is 
almost always empty with spatial preferences, but we also learn that the V-set and the several 
bargaining sets offer predictions that are unsupported by experimental and empirical evidence (see 
McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer 1 978 ,  Fiorina and Plott 1 978  and, for a general survey of the 
experimental literature employing spatial preferences, McKelvey and Ordeshook 1 990b). And 
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although we do not yet have a wholly general and universally accepted hypothesis about coalition 
formation for even simple majority games, spatial preferences provide an important arena for such 
explorations (Schofield 1 985 ,  and Bennet and Zame 1988 ,  Sharkey 1 990) since it  is there that we can 
also l earn whether a solution hypothesis matches the experimental l i terature and whether its 
predictions give us insight into actual parliamentary coalition processes (see, for example, Ordeshook 
and Winer 1 980, Laver and Schofield 1 990). 
Insofar as i ts substantive accomplishmen ts are concerned,  the spatial analysis of committees, as 
revealed by Poole and Rosen thal's (1 985,  1 99 1 )  extensive historical study of voting in the U.S. 
Congress,  is that its conceptualization of preferences allows an especially convenient summary of 
issues ,  ideology, and legislative party alignments (see also Hoadley 1 987) .  Using al l  roll calls from 
a l l  congresses beginning with the first, Poole and Rosenthal portray the emergence and d isappearance 
of issues ,  the formation and dissolu tion of parties, and the correspondence between ideology and 
public policy choices ,  so as to provide a geometric representation of American political history as that 
h istory is reflec ted in the issues that arise in the Congress and legislators' votes on them. 
The contributions of a spatial perspective would be slight, though, were those contributions 
l imited to d eveloping an ad hoc solution theory and facil itating the development of methodologies 
to measure itself. In fact, its primary contribution to our understanding of legislative and 
parliamentary processes is the framework it provides for studying the various procedures committees 
can use to reach a decision. In particular, spatial preferences serve as an especially convenien t  
structure for analyzing such things a s  the manipulation o f  outcomes b y  the selection o f  a voting 
agenda, presidential vetoes, the influence of bicameralism, and government formation in parliamen ts .  
With proofs about an all-encompassing social intransitivity as  common starting points ,  we can better 
understand, for example, 
the extent to which bicameralism limits outcomes over what might prevail in a 
unicameral legislature (briefly,  the greater the spatial separation of preferences in  the 
two legislative chambers , the more likely is a stable outcome to exist and the more 
likely is the status quo to be preserved ; see Hammond and Miller 1 987 ,  1 989,  Tsebelis 
1 993,  and , extending some of these perspectives to the study of federalism, Weingast 
1 993),  
how various parliamentary procedures such as voting one issue at a time  might induce 
stability (a stable point -- the median on each issue -- exists if  preferences on the 
issues are separable; Kramer 1 972, Shepsle 1 979,  Shepsle and Weingast 1 98 1 )  but such 
a point need not exist if preferences are not separable and committee members are 
strategic (see Kramer 1 972 again and Denzau and Mackay 1 98 1 ;  for relevant 
experimental evidence see McKelvey and Ordeshook 1 984,  Wilson 1 986) .  
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how strategic voting might limit the power of an agenda setter (briefly, although 
McKelvey's 1 976 study of global intransitivities implies that agendas can be designed 
to reach any ou tcome if all voters vote sincerely, final outcomes are l imited to the 
uncovered set of the alternatives on the agenda if voters are strategic; see Miller 1 980,  
McKelvey 1 986,  Shepsle and Weingast 1 984),  and 
how such a setter can increase his power by expanding the class of agendas at  his 
disposal (normal congressional agendas do not necessarily pit  the winner of the 
previous vote against a new alternative . Thus, they are not of the amendment agenda 
type and this increased flexibility enables a dictatorial agenda setter to reach outcomes 
that lie outside of the uncovered set; Ordeshook and Schwartz 1 987) .  
the circumstances under which strategic voters vote sincerely and,  therefore, the 
circumstances under which it is impossible to ascertain the sophistication of committee 
members (Austen-Smith 1 987) 
Although much of what we know about agendas does not presuppose spatial preferences, stripped 
of the Euclidean topology on ou tcomes and preferences, our theoretical results would lack geometric 
intuition and would confront the reader with an even greater array of uninterpreted notation and 
defi nitions. More substantively, this literature, taken as a whole, reveals not only the i mportance of 
institutional structure but alerts us to the likelihood that many if not most of the interesting battles 
in a legislature or parliament occur over the selection of rules and procedures. In fact, although an 
i nstitutional s tructure, once established , can either induce stability or l imit  the range of possible 
outcomes, the power of institutions to manipulate final outcomes implies that group preferences over
institutions are subject to the same social intransitivities that we can ascribe to simple majority rule 
with spatial  p references over policy (Coleman and Ferejohn 1 986) .  
I t  is here, then, that we begin to see the role of constitutions and social norms. If the alternative 
rules for selecting a final outcome inherit the intransitivity we ascribe to outcomes, if the rules for 
selecting those rules inherit the same thing,  and so on,  then we confront an infinite regress in w hich 
i t  becomes i mpossible to argue that institutions can so s tructure poli tical process as to induce stability. 
Indeed, not only is stability and prediction impossible, but, in more practical terms, it becomes 
impossible for society to choose (although, to confuse matters further, failing to choose can be 
conceptualized as a choice). One resolution of such a regress -- one way to avert the presumed 
irrationality or  inefficiency of never choosing -- is to terminate i t  through convention (tradition or 
norms).  In the event that such conventions do not exist, society must try to invent them, w here 
among these invented conventions are the things we call political constitutions . Thus, a lthoug h  our 
route seems indirect, the spatial analysis of committees and social choice takes us to a core question 
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i n  political theory - - how society chooses conventions, and why certain conventions "stick" whereas 
o thers do not.
Of course, it is u nreasonable to require that spatial analysis alone answer such questions. As we 
noted earlier, spatial analysis is but a specific application of a more general theoretical structure, game 
theory, and we must appeal to other elements of that theory (e.g . ,  the properties of alternative 
equilibria, i ndividual bel iefs and conjectures) to learn why some rules prevail and others do  not 
(Ordeshook 1 992,  Niou and Ordeshook 1 993b). Nevertheless, we can offer criticisms of the l iterature 
on committees that parallel those we offer later of the spatial analysis of voting and elections. First,
with but a few exceptions (see, for instance, the exceptions discussed in Section 3 of this essay), only 
the s implest institutional forms are examined - - simple coalitiona l  processes, simple amendment 
agendas (despite the fact  that legislatures rarely use this procedure except for the s implest 
circumstances, although see Ordeshook and Schwartz 1 987 ,  Banks 1 989), rules that are i mposed 
exogenously (but see Banks and Gasmi 1 987  for preliminary analysis of endogenous agenda 
formation), and legislative sub-committees that abide by rigidly adhered to restrictions on the issues 
in their domain. 
Second, the assumption that legislators or deputies have spatial preferences over policy appears 
to preclude a full treatment of the relationship between their actions and the actions of those who 
elect them. The preferences of representatives derive presumably from the preferences of their 
constituents . Assuming otherwise is to admit the possibility of being inconsistent with the usual 
assumption that the �rimary goal of election candidates is to win. That is, i t  seems inconsistent to 
suppose that politicians, when acting as legislators or as parliamentary deputies, act i n  accordance 
w ith personally held well-defined policy preferences, but when acting as candidates, wholly ignore 
those preferences and simply adhere to equilibrium strategies defined by the electorate's preferences 
and the relevant election rule. Specifically, if the electorate's preferences yield an intransitive social 
order -- the essence of McKelvey and Schofield's analysis of majority rule -- then what is the basis 
for supposing that the preferences of a representative are otherwise? 
There is, then, a serious theoretical disju ncture between the spatial analysis of legislative and 
parliamentary committees and that of elections. This disjuncture awaits closure, but even if it can 
be achieved i t  is anything but certain that it would sustain a spatial conceptualization of legislative 
or parliamentary preferences (special assumptions about probabilistic voting are sufficient to ensure 
a transitive order for the electorate - - see, for instance, Ledyard 1 98 1 ,  1 984 and Coughlin 1 992 -­
but rarely does analysis suppose anything but deterministic preferences for legislators) .  Thus, 
a l though the assumption of spatial preferences allows us to structure various questions about, say, the 
adequacy of cooperative game- theoretic solution concepts and to recast our u nderstanding of specific 
p arliamentary procedures, and although Poole and Rosenthal's ( 1 985 ,  1 99 1 )  empirical research gives 
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u s  some confidence that the spatial representation of preferences can be used to summarize important 
aspects of the issues that the U.S. Congress has confronted in i ts history, we must remain u ncertain 
as  to the full generality of these analyses as  models of real legislative and parliamentary institutions 
and processes. 
ELECTIONS: Insofar as the spatial analysis of elections is concerned, that analysi s  has contributed 
to our understanding of some fundamental things with respect to two-candidate plurality rule systems. 
Most fundamentally, we know that there are good reasons for supposing that, for a wide range of 
circumstances, if two candidates compete in a plurality- rule system ,  they espouse policies near the 
"center" of the electorate's preference distribution. That is, simple majoritarian processes, even if 
they do not yield Condorcet winners or some other simple equilibrium of strategies, generate powerful 
i ncentives for the approximate convergence of policy by the two candidates or parties that are 
assumed to be competing. 
This centrist tendency of two-candidate winner- take-all-elections is  established in several ways. 
All of them begin by formulating an election as a two- player non-cooperative game: Typically, 
citizens are robots who merely choose between voting for a preferred candidate or abstaining; the 
active players in the election game are candidates whose strategies consist of alternative positions i n  
the policy space. Because Condorcet winners cannot, b y  definition, b e  defeated when pai red against 
any other alternative, such a winner is  the Nash equilibrium to this game. That is, if both candidates 
choose the Condorcet winning alternative as their platform, neither candidate has a unilateral 
i ncentive to move to some other platform or, equivalently, no party has an incentive to nominate a 
candidate who advocates a policy other than the Condorcet winner. We can then appeal to those 
essays, beginning with Black, that assume spatial preferences and that establish sufficient conditions 
(e .g. ,  unidimensional single-peaked preferences, radially symmetric distributions of preferences) for 
the existence of such a winner. It  is in this literature, then, that we find the Median Voter Theorem, 
which identifies the electorate's median ideal preference as a Condorcet winner when preferences are 
unidimensional.  
Second, there is the research that substitutes probabilistic voting for the Median Voter Theorem's 
assumption that voters vote deterministicly -- for the assumption that small  changes in a voter's 
evaluation of a candidate can effect critically a voter's choice of candidate. Instead, probabilistic 
voting supposes that the relationship between policy, preference, and choice is continuous. By thus 
"smoothing" functional relationships and desensitizing outcomes to i ncremental  changes in  candidate 
strategies, the existence of an equilibrium is more readily established (see, for example, Hinich, 
Ledyard, and Ordeshook 1 972,  Ledyard 1 98 1 ,  1 984 and, for a general survey of this l ine of research, 
Coughlin 1 992). 
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Finally, McKelvey and Ordeshook ( 1 976) and McKelvey (1 986),  appealing to ideas like Miller's 
( 1980) u ncovered set and i ts derivative concepts, show that even if a Condorcet winner does not exist, 
but if candidates eliminate dominated strategies, then the candidates continue to adopt centrist 
policies (see also Feld, Grofman,  and Mil ler 1 988,  Miller, Grofman and Feld 1 989) .  In fact, we also 
know that the uncovered set is contained in another set called the Yolk, which generally shrinks as 
preferences become more dense (Ferejohn McKelvey and Packel 1 984 ,  Koehler 1 990, Tovey 1 993a).  
Thus, although the social preference order might be intransitive , there exist spatial positions that can 
be j udged "better" than others (positions that, as s trategies, dominate other strategies) ,  where the 
adoption of these better positions keeps candidates from wandering "too far" from some center of 
gravity of preferences, and where "too far" can itself be given precise meaning. 
Much of the research that followed Downs, Davis, Hinich ,  and Plott can be interpreted as 
ascertaining the robustness of this conclusion about the centrifugal force of winner-take-al l-elections. 
After all, there are a great many assumptions that must be satisfied before we can assert that the 
preceding analyses have much to say about politics. These assumptions include: 
only two candidates compete and neither candidate fears the entry of a third 
competitor; 
candidates are concerned solely with winning rather than with the policy positions 
they must espouse to win ;  
voters are fully informed about the candidate's platforms; 
voters are fully informed about  their own preferences; 
candidates are fully informed about the issues that concern voters, voter preferences 
on these issues, and the relative sal ience of issues; 
candidates do not deliberately render their platforms ambiguous even if clarity 
alienates potential support; 
candidates possess full spatial mobility and are u nconstrained by such things as the 
need to be nominated by a party before running in the general election or by the fact 
that voter perceptions of candidates change only slowly to the extent that they are 
based on retrospective evaluations; 
victorious candidates, like dictators, implement their campaign platforms 
unencumbered by other political actors -- candidates keep their promises; 
campaign dynamics are irrelevant insofar as we can sustain the assumption that both 
candidates reveal their platforms simultaneously; 
all eligible voters vote. 
This is a list that is likely to dissuade most people from believing that spatial theory can contribute 
much to their enterprise. On the o ther hand, 
1 0  
Calvert (1987) establishes that even if candidates hold policy preferences, the 
competitive forces of two-candidate elections compels them nevertheless to converge 
to policies near the center. 
Shepsle (1972) and McKelvey and Richelson (1974) consider the possibil i ty that 
candidates might deliberately choose to offer ambiguous p latforms; however, if all 
voters are risk averse, the median preference retains i ts attraction to candidates. 
A ranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1974) establish that if plurality is a random variable 
whose mean is determined by the candidate's platforms, and if the election is 
otherwise symmetric, then the maximization of expected plurality and probability of
winning are equivalent in the sense that they imply the same election equ ilibria. 
Harrington (1991 a,b) and Austen Smith and Banks ( 1989) explore the circums tances 
under which candidates have an incentive to keep campaign promises, and thereby 
they begin a formalization of the idea of retrospective voting.  
McKelvey and Ordeshook ( l 985a,  1986) and Bowden ( 1989),  in  research that  is closely 
related to Harrington's, employ the idea of rational expectations to show that even if 
candidates do not know the precise nature of voter preferences, even if most voters 
are only imperfectly informed about the candidate's policy positions, and even if  al l  
fully informed voters prefer extremist policies, indirect sources of information such 
as public opinion polls and campaign endorsements are sufficient, in equilibrium, to 
allow uninformed voters to vote "correctly" and to induce the candidates to centrist 
policies (see also Bernhardt and lngberman 198 5 ,  Ferejohn 1986) .  
Lupia (J 992) shows how the perspectives developed be McKelvey and Ordeshook 
(l 985a)  to treat imperfect information can be extended to analyze voting on referenda 
in a spatial context. 
As Ordeshook (1970), Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook (1972), Ledyard (198 1 ,  1 984) ,  
and Coughlin (1992) establish, non-voting, when formulated as  a probability of 
voting,  does not necessarily negate the centrist tendency of two-candidate winner­
take-all  elections ,  although Hinich ( 1977)  does show that probabilistic voting can lead 
candidates to converge to the electorate's mean rather than median preference.  
As a partial response to the finding that Condorcet winners and u ncovered sets may 
be difficult to compute and find (Bartholdi, Narasimhan, and Tovey 1990, Tovey 
1992b), Kollman, Miller and Page (1992) show that even if candidates are boundedly 
rational adaptive decision makers operating in an environment of incomplete 
information, the median preference nevertheless exerts a powerful influence on their 
s trategies if those strategies are dictated by some simple search algorithms. 
11 
A large experimental literature also demonstrates the robustness of spatial theory's primary results. 
For example, Collier, McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Williams (1 987) demonstrate under a variety of 
experimental conditions that the median preference exerts a powerful influence on candidate 
platforms even when voters can vote only retrospectively. Indeed, the median retains its 
attractiveness even if candidates are rewarded when deviating from it  (provided that they realize that 
reward only if  elected) and even if random events perturb their true spatial positions (McKelvey and 
Ordeshook 1 990). Moreover, sophisticated voters , learning that candidates converge, learn also to 
minimize the cost of voting by choosing to act retrospectively and on the basis of candidate 
reputations o r  party labels (Williams 1 99 1 , McKelvey and Ordeshook 1 985b,  Collier, Ordeshook and 
Williams 1 989 ,  Plott 1 992). 
Admi ttedly,  the attractiveness of centrist policies is weakened by the threat of entry (Palfrey 1 984 ,  
Greenberg a nd Shepsle 1 987),  by  the existence of  more than two candidates and voters who can cast 
preferential ballots (Cox 1 990b, Denzau,  Katz, and Slutsky 1 985) ,  by non-voting that derives from 
al ienation within the electorate (Hinich and Ordeshook 1 969), by institu tional variations that distort 
the competitive forces generating the alternatives voters confront (Romer and Rosenthal 1 97 8 ,  1 979,  
Rosenthal 1 990), and by the demands of campaign contributors (Aldrich 1 983) .  Nevertheless, despite 
the caveats and footnotes that must accompany any summary assertion , majoritarian electoral 
institutions exert a powerful centrifugal force on candidates and parties. If we combine this 
conclusion with the formal proofs of Du verger's ( 1 956) hypothesis about winner-take-al l  systems 
(Palfrey 1 989 ,  Fedderson, Sened and Wright 1 990, Fedderson 1 992), which assume that voters vote 
strategically for viable candidates or outcomes, we find at least one insti tutional arrangement - ­
winner- take-all  elections in which the victorious candidate has a relatively free hand at implementing 
his or her campaign platform -- that yields but a few political parties (two in the abstract equilibrium 
of the models), al l  of whom compete with centrist policy platforms. 
Of the caveats to this conclusion, though, perhaps none is more important than that its validity 
depends critically on the assumption that centrist policies in fact  exist. The validity of this 
assumption, in turn, depends on the type of issues that voters use to evaluate candidates and policies. 
The usual spatial p reference structure assumes, first, that there is a consensus on the cri teria (spatial 
issues) used to evaluate candidates as well as a consensus on how public policy and candidate election 
p latforms map into this set of criteria. Second, that structure assumes also that although people's 
p references may differ ,  there is sufficient commonality of interests to a llow similar policy preferences 
as well as agreement about policies that ought to be avoided . Generally, voters are assumed to 
evaluate candidates and public policy on the basis of some small number (usually one, two or three) 
of generalized issues (ideological or otherwise) and ideal points are assumed to cluster sufficiently so 
that their d istribution can be described by standard probability density functions. 
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There is, though, an alternative to this structure. If voters conceptualize pol icy in redistributional 
terms so one person's gain can come only at the expense of someone else, then the usual spatial 
representation may be inappropriate. Indeed, when the things a government supplies to its citizens 
are perfectly divisible,  transferable, and in constant supply, we can require one d imension for every 
person or household in society to represent preferences and ideal points will be widely scattered and 
located at  the vertices of the constraint that defines feasible policy. In this event, there is no reason 
to suppose that candidates or parties converge (approximately or otherwise) to anything (barring some 
very specialized assumptions about probabilistic voting, see Coughlin 1 992). No proposed coalition 
is invulnerable to disruption by an appropriately constructed counter-proposal, and the only 
prediction we can offer about final outcomes is that each candidate tries to form some majority 
coalition and proposes to expropriate all things from those excluded from the coalition. 
Thus, the applicability of spatial theory's fundamental theoretical results depends not only on the 
relevance of a rather special and simple institutional arrangement, but also on the types of issues that 
arise the structure of preferences over them. Thus, it is essential to understand that the spatial 
perspective is not intended to be a universal one, but rather a perspective that is only more or less 
relevant to politics, depending on the nature of the issues that concern society. 
2 .  Fundamen tal Con ceptual Achievements 
If we want to understand better spatial theory's l imitations as well as what it contributes to our 
understanding of politics, we need to consider why i t  focuses on 2-candidate winner- take-all­
elections. First, there is the fact that the existence of equilibria -- at  least of pure strategy Nash 
equilibria - - is more difficult to establish when we allow more candidates or more complex 
institutional arrangements (see, for example, Greenberg and Weber 1 985 ,  Greenberg and Shepsle 
1 987,  Cox 1 987,  l 990a, l 990b ). Suppose we try to model party- list proportional representation 
systems in which final policy is dictated by a governing parliamentary coalition. If we assume that 
voters pay some attention to the governing coalitions that form after votes are counted and 
parliamentary seats allocated, then we are stymied by the fact that we possess only partially 
satisfactory treatments of coali tion formation in committees that allow for the calcu lation of 
possibilities in a way that al lows unambiguous inferences about the policy consequences of different 
electoral outcomes, and, thus, that allows an unambiguous defini tion of best response s trategies for 
voters (for some attempt to grapple empirically with this problem see Rosenthal and Sen 1 97 3  and 
1 977  whereas for an initial theoretical excursion see Baron 1 993  ). 
Second, as poli tical scientists became more adept at game theory, they came to appreciate the 
necessity for pursuing Farquharson's (1 969) agenda of allowing voters as well as candidates to act 
strategically. But whereas strategic and sincere voting are equivalent in two-candidate plurality 
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elections, the analytic difficulties of allowing strategic voting under nearly any other institutional 
arrangement at  times appear insurmountable and tractable only with heroic assumptions (see, for 
example, Myerson and Weber 1 993) .  Compounding matters further, of course, is the fact that 
whenever l arge numbers of decision makers are allowed to act strategically and when few or none of 
them possess dominant strategies, then typically there are a multiplicity of equilibria. In this event,  
i t  can be a supremely challenging task to characterize al l  of them, which is what we must oftentimes 
do before we can begin eliminating certain equilibria as reasonable predictions. 
A final explanation for spatial analysis's focus on two-candidate winner- take-all elections is that 
there does not appear to be any other institutional structure that serves as a convenient focus for 
research.  Moving from the simple winner-take-all format confronts the researcher with a long list 
of possibili ties -- the single non- transferable vote (SNTV), approval voting, party- list proportional 
representation, the single transferable vote (STY), unicameral versus bicameral legislatures, 
presidential versus parliamentary systems, line-item vetoes -- so that every research paper threatens 
to assume the character of being but a highly specialized (read: narrow) creature. 
This is not to say that we cannot find valuable contributions to our understanding of alternative 
or more realistic institutional arrangements. 
Austen-Smith and Banks ( 1 988) ,  for example, establish the strategic complexity 
inherent in proportional and parliamentary systems as well as the fact that, owing to 
strategic voting, proportional representation systems need not produce an allocation 
of seats across parties that matches the distribution of preferences. 
Hinich and Ordeshook ( 1 974) show how the Median Voter Theorem can be adapted 
to predict the policy biases of an electoral college as compared to a d irect vote, and 
show, in  particular, that although the electoral college can be credited with biasing 
policy in the first half of this century, the increasing homogeneity of the country has 
virtually eliminated the main sources of bias today. 
Cox ,  in a sequence of essays (I 984a, 1 984b,  1 987 ,  1 990a, 1 993 ) ,  has made a concerted 
effort at modeling alternative voting systems with the idea of contrasting equilibria 
in them with those found in winner-take-all systems. Of special note is his 
c lassification of election systems that yield convergent equilibria and those that yield 
divergent ones (Cox 1 990a, l 990b: briefly, convergence is less l ikely in systems that 
allow voters to express second, third , etc. preferences or that give voters few votes 
relative to the number of seats and candidates) ,  as well as h is analyses of strategic 
voting under SNTV that provides a theoretical explanation for Reed's ( 1 991 ) finding 
in  Japan of an apparent equilibrium of s+l competitive candidates, wheres is the 
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number of seats in  an election district (Cox 1 993 ; see also Osborne and Slivinski 1 993 
and for a survey of earlier research into multi-candidate elections, Shepsle 1 991 ). 
Baron ( 1 993) explores the positions of parties in a parliamentary system with 
proportional representation and offers a sequential bargaining model in  which those 
positions diverge in accordance with our empirical understanding of the consequences 
of party-list proportional representation, and where the extent of that divergence 
depends on the process whereby government coali tions are negotiated. 
It is true that these analyses rely on specialized assumptions. The models of A usten-Smith and 
Banks and Hinich and Ordeshook are one-dimensional and Baron's is two-dimensional; Austen-Smith 
and Banks assume a transferable good among voters, while they, like Baron, a llow only three parties; 
and Cox's analysis of SNTV assumes that candidate positions are fixed . Each essay ,  then, is but an 
incremental  advance and none provides a general theoretical result .  Nevertheless, we can see in them 
spatial theory's potential for contribu ting to our u nderstanding of even these more complex political 
processes. First, and as I have already noted, it offers a formal conceptualization of individual 
preferences that l inks political theory to economic theory (Kramer 1 973 ,  Klevorick and Kramer 1 97 3 ,  
Boylan, Ledyard, and McKelvey 1 993 ) and thereby promises a rigorous synthesis o f  these two 
disciplines. 
Second,  because spatial analysis formulates election competition as a game, it brings to the analysis 
of elections al l  the tools of game theory as well as an appreciation of the ambiguities inherent in  
decision contexts i n  which people's fates are interdependent (e .g . ,  the implications of  multiple 
equilibria, the role of coordination in equilibrium selection, the ambiguities in extensive form 
representations of social processes) . Game-theoretic reasoning in the study of elections , moreover, 
compels us  to consider issues that might otherwise be ignored , such as strategic voting in mass 
electorates. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue the profound importance of this contribution as 
we begin to try to u nderstand not only how political eli tes might respond to alternative institutional 
structures, but  also how "ordinary" ci tizens respond to them as wel l .  
Third, and somewhat paradoxically, spatial analysis deepens our understanding of politics by i t  
failure to resolve some issues. One of the most pervasive findings of the l i terature that  seeks to 
identify issues and measure preferences using multidimensional scaling is that, regardless of the 
electorate u nder consideration, only one or two issues is required generally to represent preferences 
(see, for i ns tance, Enelow and Hinich's 1 984 and Poo le and Rosenthal's 1 984 analysis of American 
voting,  Poole and Rosenthal's 1 985 ,  1 991 study of issues in the U.S. Congress, and Chu, Hinich,  and 
Lin's 1 993 analysis of spatial preferences in Taiwan). On the other hand, more direct evaluations of 
voter perceptions and of candidate and party platforms suggest that the number of issues greatly 
exceeds this small number (see, for example, Aldrich and McKelvey 1 977  and Niou and Hsieh 1 993). 
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Thus, spatial analysis raises important questions about the very meaning of the concept of an issue, 
about the meaning of public opinion, and about the relationship between public policy and people's 
evaluations of policy. Enelow and Hinich ( 1 984) and Hinich and Pollard ( I  98 1 )  offer a distinction 
between "actionable issues" and issues in some basic policy space in which voters somehow imbed 
actionable issues . The analysis and conceptualization of this idea of multiple layers of issue spaces, 
though, remains abstract and fails to address such basic matters as how voters connect these layers or 
even how political elites might try to manipulate the connections. Of course, i t  may be u nreasonable 
to require that spatial theory alone address such matters .  At the very least, then, it is important to 
appreciate that spatial theory makes evident a research matter that ,  although fundamental to our 
u nderstanding of politics, has gone largely unnoticed by researchers who employ different conceptual 
tools. 
Fourth, a spatial conceptualization provides a convenient basis for comparing the performance of 
a lternative i nstitutions. As suggested throughout this essay, the questions we can hope to ask and 
answer include: Which voting systems satisfy various welfare criteria, such as ensuring the selection 
of a Condorcet winner when such a winner exists?  What are the implications of direct democracy 
devices such as the town meeting and popular referenda as compared to the indirect mechanisms of 
representative democracy? What is the influence of such things as bicameralism, presidential vetoes , 
and legislative subcommittees on final outcomes? Without a spatial topology on preferences, the 
comparison of outcomes is difficult and an evaluation of the welfare consequences of any difference -
- a quali tative evaluation of the meaning of "significant difference" -- nearly impossible to form (see, 
for example, Tsebelis's 1 993 use of spatial analysis to address the debate over the virtues of 
presidential versus parliamentary government). 
Finally, we should appreciate what even the basic elements of spatial theory tells us about the very 
fou ndations of democratic theory. Although the Median Voter Theorem is the best-known result,  
i t  is in  fact  not the most important. That theorem merely establishes a sufficient condition for a 
rather specialized type of equilibrium. Instead , the most important result appears when we compare 
the policies likely to prevail in simple plurality rule elections with those likely to prevail i n  
cooperative committees with those likely to  prevai l  i n  committees using restrictive binary agendas . 
Specifically, if preferences are Euclidean, then the theoretical prediction is that all three abstract 
institutional mechanisms yield outcomes that fall within the same subset of the policy space -- the 
u ncovered set or some nearly geometrically equivalent subset (although it makes use of a number or 
results -- see, for instance, McKelvey and Ordeshook 1 976 and Shepsle and Weingast 1 984 -- the 
formal structure of this argument is best summarized in McKelvey 1 986). 
Among the many things this result accomplishes is that i t  answers a fundamental question about 
representation.  Specifically, i t  tells us that, in principle at least, we should be indifferent between 
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having policy determined by a two-candidate election and having the entire electorate meet to debate 
matters using simple majority rule. Because this latter possibility is impractical, we can view two­
candidate elections as a practical solution .  Moreover, to the extent that preferences within a 
legislature mirror those of the electorate, we should also be indifferent between letting the legislature 
determine outcomes , using whatever agendas it might choose to give coherence to i ts deliberations, 
and letting the electorate choose using agenda procedures of its own design. Once again, then, 
legislative representation can be viewed as a practical response to the fact  that electorates of even a 
few million persons cannot duplicate the New England town meeting. 
Spatial theory, then, provides us with a basic null model of democracy, against which we can 
compare realistic alternatives and answer such questions as: how great a distortion in the equivalence 
of these three forms is occasioned by the fact that few voters pay much attention to the policies that 
legislators enact? What distortions arise owing to alternative schemes of districting and alternative 
methods of conducting elections? Are there representation schemes that allow a political system to 
approximate, in terms of final outcomes, a wholly collegial electorate? 
3. Science and Engineering
Despite spatial theory's accomplishment, we cannot escape the fact  that the formal theoretical
results it offers impose assumptions that depreciate their immediate practical application. Anyone 
trying to use them to convince a constitutional reformer, for example, that he or she ought to prefer 
one type of political institution rather than another will meet with failure if not a sense of frustration 
about the seeming irrelevance of established theorems. Of what interest is it to know that plurality 
rule i nduces centrist policies provided that some list of ten or so assumptions are satisfied? Where 
are the results that assist reformers who must try to establish s table political institutions in the 
deteriorating economies of the successor states of the former Soviet Union? Can we say whether large 
or small election districts under SNTV best facilitates the development of political parties? Does 
spatial theory tell us anything about how to construct a viable federal government with corresponding 
election rules in  an ethnicly heterogeneous society? What advice can we offer about alternative 
methods of electing a president, or even about whether to adopt a presidential or parliamentary 
system, that s tudents using less analytical methods and perspectives cannot also provide? 
In fact, the problem here has less to do with any inherent limitation of spatial theory than i t  does 
with the character of political science itself and with an imperfect understanding on the part of 
formal theorists of their u l timate objective. Once we appreciate this objective and the way it is 
achieved, then we can better appreciate spatial theory's contribution - - actual and potential . 
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A nyone familiar with electoral systems in even a few randomly selected countries appreciates that 
such systems come in great variety. Even if we restrict ourselves to the most basic elements of their 
description, we have at least the following: 
Single-member districts using simple plural ity rule; 
Single-member district using majority rule with a runoff if no one receives a majority 
on the first ballot 
Multi-member districts using party- list proportional representation; 
Multi-member districts using a single non- transferable vote; 
Multi-member districts using a single transferable vote; and 
Single or multi-member district using preferential voting such as the alternative vote 
or approval voting. 
Our descriptions can be made more complicated, moreover, by considering thresholds that parties 
must surpass before assuring themselves of representation, alternative algebraic formulas for 
a l locating parliamentary seats, the possibility of pre-election party coalitions and pooling of votes, 
and the nature of the offices being filled. Not only must we consider whether the voter is voting for 
a u ni tary president, a collegial presidency,  members of a city council,  or deputies to a parliamentary 
body, but we must also consider the ultimate relationship of these offices to policy, since, presumably, 
i t  is this relationship that provides the voter's ultimate motivation. Finally, to make matters more 
complicated stil l ,  we must consider that we can easily think of situations in which voters, when 
entering the voting booth, are asked to participate in two or more of these variations simultaneously. 
Clearly, the character of the strategic environments in which candidates and parties compete are 
nearly endless, and i t  is unreasonable to suppose that spatial theorists can model every one of them 
or  that a handful  of "fundamental" theorems can summarize the differences among them with respect
to s trategic i mperatives of cand idates, voters, and poli tical elites. Even a cursory reading of Cox's 
( 1 990b) survey of research on multicandidate spatial competition should convince the reader that not 
only does the variety of election laws allow for a near infinitiy of assumptions about candidate 
objectives and voter decision rules, but also that simple theoretical generalizations about the structure 
of competition are u nlikely to be forthcoming.
Nevertheless, to see what can be done, consider Romer and Rosenthal's ( 1 978 ,  1 97 9) study of 
school board referenda in Oregon.  Briefly, the setting for their study is a referendum in which a 
school board can offer the electorate a take- i t-or- leave-it  proposal, which if rejected by voters resul ts 
in  the i mposition of a generally undesirable reversion outcome - - frequently, a school budget of zero 
(for a general summary of this line of research see Rosenthal 1 990). 
Theoretically, their study demonstrates li ttle more than that, by presenting voters with such a 
those who control the initial proposal have a powerful influence on final outcomes . Specifically,  a 
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school board that seeks to increase expenditures can secure passage of a proposal that exceeds the 
spending increase most preferred by the median voter, which is only logical since voters m ust choose 
between a "bad" alternative and a wholly unacceptable one. But if  Romer and Rosenthal fail to 
establish a theorem that establishes a wholly unanticipated consequence, what do they accomplish? 
We might say that they test their model and find support for i ts associated hypotheses. B ut so what, 
and what hypothesis would we reject if the data failed to support their model? Certainly we would 
not  be prepared to reject the rational choice paradigm i tself. Instead, we (and they) would probably 
argue that "other factors" mitigated aga inst their model's strategic imperatives, at which point their 
results might have served primarily as input for PHD dissertations searching for these factors. 
In  fact, Romer and Rosenthal's contribution is more fundamental than the proof of some new 
theorem or  falsification of some previously accepted hypothesis. Instead, they give us confidence that 
spatial theory's perspectives have general relevance and that i t  provides a way to conceptualize 
preferences and to model the strategic environment engendered by specific institutional s tructures. 
That is, they give us confidence that we can usefully combine a spatial conceptualization of 
preferences and policy with a game- theoretic model of a l ternative insti tu tional structures when trying 
to assess the implications of those structures. In addition, they expand our experience with 
confronting reality with purely abstract tools and with an imaginative recombination of those tools. 
As such, then, they contributed greatly to what ought to be a fundamental goal of political science 
as a profession, political engineering -- the design and assessment of political institutions. 
Romer and Rosenthal's approach does not stand alone. Another innovative demonstration of the 
applicability of spatial analysis that directly applies the Median Voter Theorem is Klevorick and 
K ramer's ( 1 973)  study of the German regional assemblies used to control pollutants in the Rhine river 
basin ,  the Gennosenschaften. Within each Gennosenschaften , the voting weights of each industrial 
and village representative depends on the taxes paid by the relevant entity in the last period, which 
depends on  the tax rate and the amount of pollution each firm and village chooses to produce. The 
tax rate, in turn, is determined by a majority vote in each Gennosenschaften and is thereby dependent 
on the median preference there. But, completing the cycle , this median preference depends on voting
weights. So the theoretical question is whether there exists an equilibrium tax - - a tax that is a fixed 
point in the sense that, once all persons adjust their propensity to pollute in accordance with it, the 
resulting voting weights imply that tax .  A characterization of the conditions under which such an 
equilibrium exists then serves as  an important component of any effort to replicate the German 
experience elsewhere with a similar institution structure. In the process, moreover, Kramer and 
Klevorick demonstrate formally how spatial preferences can be derived from preferences of the 
traditional economic sort -- from preferences over consumable goods and profits, combined with 
constraints on  product inputs and production functions (see also Kramer 1 973) .  
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Both experimentally and theoretically, this derivation of spatial preferences is developed more fully 
in Boylan , et a l  ( 1 991 ) and Boylan, Ledyard , and McKelvey ( 1 993 ) in a way that allows spatial theory 
to be applied to some classic problems of political-economic development. In this model, voters must 
choose between immediate consumption of some publ icly produced good and public investment that 
can be used to increase future supply of that good. Marrying the classical economic model of 
investment and growth to a model of two-candidate competition, where the candidates compete by 
proposing alternative macro-economic platforms and voters must weight future against current 
consumption, conditions are established for the existence of a two-candidate stationary investment­
consumption equilibrium. Moreover, experimental data are offered to suggest that candidates 
converge to such a policy, at least when voters are fully informed about the relationship between 
investment and growth. 
Like Romer and Rosenthal, this model is important for more than the theorems it offers (which 
depend critically on fine technical details) or the experimental evidence offered on its behalf (which 
is subject to the criticism of being li ttle more that a complex IQ test of undergraduate subjects) . 
Because of the model's complexity, theorems describing equilibria impose strong assumptions. I t  is 
virtually impossible to derive formally the influence of the model's most interesting parameters (for 
example, the information conditions of voters, the extent to which the candidates must keep their 
election promises, or the frequency with which incumbents are allowed to change policy). In this 
instance, the experimenta l  laboratory seems the only practical device for exploring such matters. 
What differentiates research here from earlier experimental explorations of election processes (with 
the possible exception of Plott 1 991 ) is that the stage is now set to use the experimental laboratory as 
a tool of political institutional design. Since most design problems cannot wait for the development 
of models and the proof of theorems that apply specifically to them and since such models and 
theorems are unlikely to be developed in any event, the experimental lab can begin performing the 
same function in political science as the wind tunnel does in aeronautical engineering.  
Each of these studies demonstrates how the spatial analyst's perspective can structure research 
about political processes and institutions without abandoning scientific rigor. They also demonstrate 
that we must learn to understand the distinction between and interdependence of engineering and 
science. 
I began this essay by noting that spatial analysis is but a specific application of game theory and 
that many of i ts limitations and accomplishments are those of tha t theory. If the spatial analyst has 
not fully incorporated features of, say, incomplete information and uncertainty into his models and 
if he considered only a few of the strategic environments that we think are important, it  is largely 
because the analytic challenges that such circumstances present are severe. Nevertheless, there are 
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inadequacies that derive from an imperfect understanding of our craft and the incorrect incentives 
that that misunderstanding establish .  
As of this essay's writing journals are inundated with manuscripts employing the latest faddish 
techniques and concepts of game theory -- repeated games, signaling games , s tochastic games, 
sequential rationality, and so on. Although some of this research promises to deepen our 
understanding of processes that have heretofore been neglected, too often the display of technical skill  
is merely a substitute for thinking deeply about a problem and for confronting substantive 
complexity. Too often research consist merely of an adaptation of a particular idea that yields neither 
a general result nor anything that relates to some specific empirical phenomena or problem. The 
rewards from lengthening one's vita are too great to ignore, and they often result  in "research" that 
is little more than the repeated application of some newly learned "hammer" to slightly modified 
"nails." 
Of course, fads die and what frequently remains is a residue of new insights, a long with an 
augmentation of the technical skills of the profession. However, i t  remains true that with attention 
focused on mere mathematical manipulations and with promotions arriving most quickly to those who 
can sustain a s tream of publications, the type of research cited in this section is often u ndervalued. 
Instead, we find manuscripts with a minimal ratio of meaningful results to notation and in which 
things loftily proclaimed to be "theorems" are based on such restrictive assu mptions that they 
contribute l i ttle to our understand ing of anything. It would seem that i t  is often easier to theorize 
about a Planet X than our own. 
The application of game theory and spatial analysis will achieve maturity when practitioners 
suppress the instinct to begin essays with silly sentences like "assume an infinite sequence of 
candidates ," or  "we find an equilibrium such that . . .  " and to avoid burdening the reader with notation 
that promises a degree of generality that is lost with the first assumption. We must learn to devalue 
notation in favor of theoretical insight and to ape not the mathematicians craft but to develop one of 
our own. 
Nevertheless, we are encouraged not only by the essays reviewed in this section but also by the 
increasing amount of research directed at  classes of elections systems other than simple plurality rule 
and that are motivated by substantive rather than analytic concerns. Of course, there remain any 
n umber of issues concerning party formation and fragmentation or of the advantages and 
disadvantages of presidential versus parliamentary systems that can only be understood with the rigor 
that spatial analysis and game theory promises. The case studies upon which our c urrent 
u nderstanding rests are too few in number to permit definitive conclusions. But to pursue these 
issues, we must learn to value something in add ition to a nicely arrayed lemmas and theorems. These 
are valuable things. But  too often, "political scientists" prove theorems about things that are of such 
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a degree of complexity that the resulting lemmas, propositions, and theorems require assumptions of 
such specificity as to preclude generality and even relevance. If the list of assumptions required to 
establish a particular result exceeds what can be summarized in a single breath, then we have a good 
i ndication that the word "theorem" ought to be banned from the corresponding manuscript. At a 
minimum we must learn to differentiate between those things that can be stated as general principles 
(e.g. , the Median Voter Theorem, the McKelvey-Schofield results about cycling, Du verger's Law) and 
those things that are merely complex combinations of those principles (e.g . ,  manifestations of strategic 
complexity owing to incomplete information in particular environments). 
At  the same time, we must learn to value more practical objectives . Natural science does not 
progress merely because the phenomena natural scientists study are less complex than social processes 
(which may be true), nor are the engineering efforts that feed off natural science theory successful 
merely because they rest on a firm theoretical base. Instead, success derives from the interaction of 
these enterprises. The search for solutions to practical problems uncovers new problems and empirical 
regularities that are then subject to general theoretical inquiry and explanation , and theoretical results 
are "tested" when we try to use them to facil itate the discovery of solutions to practical problems. 
Unfortunately, this interplay is largely absent from political science. As a consequence ,  the 
proponents of formal political analysis too often fail to differentiate between the things that allow 
pure theoretical investigation and the things that must be studied without resorting to the mass 
production of lemmas and theorems. Nevertheless, despite the frequent cri tical tone of this essay, 
it should by now be evident that spatial analysis -- owing to i ts general structure, to the well-defined 
problems it poses, and to i ts self-evident shortcomings - - promises to be fertile ground for the 
synergy of science and engineering. What remains is merely a better developed interest in solving 
specific practical problems of insti tutional design and the rewards that come from doing so. 
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